References
This it the list of references for my work Subject of experience and personal identity.
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- FASCHING, Wolfgang (2010). 'I am of the nature of Seeing': Phenomenological Reflections on the Indian Notion of Witness-Consciousness. In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, No Self?: Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press.
- FASCHING, Wolfgang (2012). On the Advaitic Identification of Self and Consciousness. In: Irina Kuznetsova, Jonardon Ganeri, Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (eds.): Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue. Self and No-Self. Farnham: Ashgate 2012, 165-180
- FASCHING, Wolfgang (2016). The Non -plurality of the I: On the Question of the Ultimate Subject of Experience. In: Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 23, Numbers 1-2, pp. 140-157(18)
- GALLAGHER, Shaun and ZAHAVI, Dan (2016). Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/>.
- HELLIE, Benj (2013). Against Egalitarianism. Analysis 73 (2):304-320.
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- KLAWONN, Erich (2009). Mind and Death: A Metaphysical Investigation. Distribution in the U.S. And Canada, International Specialized Book Services.
- KOLAK, Daniel (2004). I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics. Synthese Library Volume 325.
- MISHARA, Aaron L.; LYSAKER, Paul H.; SCHWARTZ, Michael A. (2014). Self-disturbances in Schizophrenia: History, Phenomenology, and Relevant Findings From Research on Metacognition. Schizophrenia Bulletin. 2014 Jan; 40(1): 5–12.
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- OLSON, Eric T. (2017). Personal Identity. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/identity-personal/>.
- PARFIT, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
- PRIEST, Stephen (2012). The Unconditioned Soul. In: Göcke, Benedikt Paul (ed.). After Physicalism. The University of Notre Dame Press.
- SARTRE, Jean-Paul (1943). L'Etre et le néant. Paris: Tel Gallimard; English translation: H. E. Barnes. Being and Nothingness, New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.
- SLUGA, H. (1996). “Whose house is that?” Wittgenstein on the self. In H. Sluga & D. Stern (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy, pp. 320-353).
- STRAWSON, Galen (2003). What is the Relation Between An Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience? Philosophical Issues Vol. 13, Issue 1. pp 279–315
- THOMSON, Garrett (2008). Counting subjects. Synthese 162 (3):373 - 384.
- ZAHAVI, Dan (2000). Self and consciousness. In Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 55-74.
- ZAHAVI, Dan (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
- ZAHAVI, Dan & KRIEGEL, Uriah (2015). For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not. In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology. Routledge. pp. 36-53.