Edralis's blog

Awareness Monism (references)

  1. ALBAHARI, Miri (2002). Against No-Ātman Theories of Anattā. Asian Philosophy 12 (1):5-20.
  2. BARKER, Chris (2002). The Dynamics of Vagueness. Linguistics and Philosophy 25:1–36.
  3. CARNAP, Rudolf (1950). Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4. pp. 20-40.
  4. DASGUPTA Surendranath (1975), A History of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass)
  5. DEUTSCH, Eliot (1969). Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction. East-West Center Press, University of Hawaii
  6. Edralis (2019). Subject of experience and personal identity [bachelor’s thesis].
  7. FASCHING, Wolfgang (2009). The Mineness of Experience. Continental Philosophy Review 42 (2):131-148.
  8. FASCHING, Wolfgang (2010). 'I Am of the Nature of Seeing': Phenomenological Reflections on the Indian Notion of Witness-Consciousness. In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, No Self?: Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press.
  9. FASCHING, Wolfgang (2012). On the Advaitic Identification of Self and Consciousness. In: Irina Kuznetsova, Jonardon Ganeri, Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (eds.): Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue. Self and No-Self. Farnham: Ashgate 2012, 165-180
  10. FASCHING, Wolfgang (2016): The Non-plurality of the I: On the Question of the Ultimate Subject of Experience. In: Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 23, Numbers 1-2, pp. 140-157(18)
  11. FASCHING, Wolfgang (2020). Prakāśa. A few reflections on the Advaitic understanding of consciousness as presence and its relevance for philosophy of mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09690-2
  12. FASCHING, Wolfgang (2021). The I: A dimensional account. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (2):249-260.
  13. GRIMES, John A. (1996). A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English. State University of New York Press
  14. HELLIE, Benj (2013). Against Egalitarianism. Analysis 73 (2):304-320.
  15. HUSSERL, Edmund (2006). Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934). Die C-Manuskripte. Ed. by D. Lohmar. Dordrecht: Springer (Husserliana Materialien VIII).
  16. JAMES, William (1950). The Principles of Psychology, in two volumes. Volume One. [New York]: Dover Publications.
  17. KERN, Joe (2020). The Odds of Existing: Why Death is Not the End. Unpublished manuscript. accessed 14 March 2021 < https://www.docdroid.net/jM2s0ac/the-odds-of-existing-or-why-death-is-not-the-end-may-2020-joe-kern-pdf>
  18. KLAWONN, Erich (1998). The Ontological Concept of Consciousness. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 33:55-69.
  19. KLAWONN, Erich (2009). Mind and Death: A Metaphysical Investigation. Distribution in the U.S. And Canada, International Specialized Book Services.
  20. KOLAK, Daniel (2004). I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics. Synthese Library Volume 325.
  21. LOY, David (2019). Nonduality. Wisdom Publications
  22. MAHARAJ, Nisargadatta (1973). I Am That. transl. Maurice Frydman. accessed 13 March 2021 <https://ia801201.us.archive.org/35/items/IAmThatBySriNisargadattaMaharaj/I-Am-That-by-Sri-Nisargadatta-Maharaj.pdf>
  23. NAGEL, Thomas (1965). Physicalism. Philosophical Review 74 (July):339-56.
  24. PARFIT, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
  25. PLUNKETT, David & SUNDELL, Timothy (2013). Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (23):1-37.
  26. PLUNKETT, David (2015). Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):828-874.
  27. RAM-PRASAD, Chakravarthi (2001). Knowledge and Liberation in Classical Indian Thought. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
  28. ŚAṄKARA. Brahma Jnānāvalī Mālā. transl. S. N. Sastri. accessed 13 March 2021 <http://www.bhakthi.in/stotras.php?id=27>
  29. SCHRÖDINGER, Erwin (1964). My View of the World. Cambridge University Press
  30. STRAWSON, Galen (2011). The Minimal Subject. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
  31. ZAHAVI, Dan & Kriegel, Uriah (2015). For-Me-Ness: What It Is and What It Is Not. In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology. Routledge. pp. 36-53.
  32. ZAHAVI, Dan (2000). Self and Consciousness. In Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 55-74.
  33. ZAHAVI, Dan (2003). Phenomenology of Self. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press. pp. 56-75.
  34. ZAHAVI, Dan (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
  35. ZAHAVI, Dan (2012). The Time of the Self. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84, pp.143-159.
  36. ZAHAVI, Dan (2017). Thin, Thinner, Thinnest: Defining the Minimal Self. in: C. Durt, T. Fuchs, C. Tewes (eds.): Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture: Investigating the Constitution of the Shared World. MIT Press, 2017. pp. 193-199
  37. ZUBOFF, Arnold (1990). One self: The logic of experience. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):39-68.

References